h3.Armenia: On A Precipice

h4.Prime Minister Nichol Pashinyan has forged ahead with a vision for Armenia’s nation building in spite of military losses in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The author discusses some of the machinations of political peacemaking in Armenia.

I n the aftermath of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 and Azerbaijan’s offensive against Artsakh in 2023, Armenia and its people have engaged in
considerable soul-searching. The prevailing attitude is one of fear: fear of possible Azerbaijani and Turkish aggression, fear of a loss of statehood,
and fear of losing a generation of youth to war. Armenia’s government has tried to focus on nation-building projects within its existing boundaries
through its “Real Armenia” plan, but this is resisted by those who view it as abandoning Armenia’s claim to the disputed territories.

Nagorno-Karabakh is a disputed territory in the South Caucasus. Possession of the territory is contested between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and following
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dispute grew into the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Taking place between 1988 and 1994, the war ended with an Armenian
victory over Azerbaijan. A result of this outcome was the creation of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh — later renamed the Republic of Artsakh — by the
ethnic Armenian population of the disputed region. Although Armenia did not officially recognize the independence of Artsakh, it served as its financial
and military supporter. Meanwhile, on the international stage, Nagorno-Karabakh was regarded as part of Azerbaijan, and Artsakh was recognized by few states.

In 2020, after years of low-intensity conflict, hostilities again escalated into open warfare. Azerbaijan launched the initial offensive against Armenia and
the breakaway Republic of Artsakh in what would become the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. The war lasted forty-four days and ended with an Azerbaijani victory.
Portions of Nagorno-Karabakh were captured by Azerbaijan, shrinking the Republic of Artsakh. Armenia reported the deaths of 3,825 servicemen in the war, and
post-war skirmishes continued in the region, including substantial clashes in 2022.

Another assault was launched by Azerbaijan in 2023 against Artsakh. From the outset, the stated aim of the offensive was the surrender and dismantlement of
Artsakh. The operation lasted only one day, between September 19–20, before a ceasefire agreement was reached that included a provision for the disbandment
of the Artsakh Defence Army. On September 28, the President of Artsakh signed a decree to dissolve all state institutions by the start of 2024. The renewed
hostilities led the population of Nagorno-Karabakh, mainly ethnic Armenians, to flee to neighbouring Armenia.

On June 30, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan spoke at the American University of Armenia (AUA) to a collection of foreign and Armenian academics
gathered for the International Conference on National Identity in a Time of Crisis. Hosted by AUA’s Center for Ethics in Public Affairs, the conference
brought scholars from around the world together to discuss the nature of nations and nation-building at a time when Armenians are rethinking their own
national identity.

Throughout his remarks, Pashinyan expressed his desire to focus on nation-building within the present boundaries of Armenia. He noted the importance of the
Armenian Apostolic Church to Armenia’s national identity and pointed to the role of the ancient Armenian state in establishing it as an institution. Drawing
on this historical parallel, Pashinyan emphasized the role of the political state in shaping the identity of a people and Armenia in particular. This aligns
with what he has termed the ideology of “Real Armenia,” which Pashinyan has articulated in previous speeches.

In line with his emphasis on the existing Republic, Pashinyan’s vision for Armenia’s future involves a more arms-length relationship with the Armenian diaspora.
The concern motivating this approach is that the interests of the broader Armenian nation — when taken to include the diaspora — do not always align with those
of the Republic of Armenia. If fealty to the nation is thought not to require loyalty to the Republic, Armenians might deprioritize the interests of the Republic.
Pashinyan appears to believe that this would inhibit his nation-building efforts within the country. Thus, he hopes to distance Armenia from its diaspora in order
to develop a state-focused patriotism.

Relatedly, Pashinyan stressed that the boundaries of the state he is concerned with are those of Armenia as it presently exists following the recent clashes
with Azerbaijan. The territories that were historically home to Armenians were characterized by Pashinyan as the “Armenia of our dreams,” as opposed to the
“Real Armenia” within its present, internationally recognized borders. During the question period that followed his speech, several Armenian scholars pressed
the Prime Minister on whether he was abandoning Armenia’s claim to the lost territories and expressed their concern that their country was shrinking. In response,
Pashinyan reiterated his position that the best approach for Armenia would be to focus on the existing state and build institutional capacity.

Pashinyan’s “Real Armenia” proposal – distancing the nation from its diaspora and focusing on the existing state rather than its historic territories - are controversial.

These two features of Pashinyan’s “Real Armenia” proposal — distancing the nation from its diaspora and focusing on the existing state rather than its
historic territories — are controversial. Both the historic territories and the diaspora community loom large in Armenia’s national identity. Although
he did not comment at AUA on the new nation-building projects that he hopes to pursue, the Armenian government’s major project is its “Crossroads of Peace”
initiative. Unveiled in 2023, the plan aims to build transportation infrastructure that would connect Armenia with its neighbours Türkiye, Azerbaijan,
Iran, and Georgia. With Armenia at the core of a network linking the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf, Black Sea, and Mediterranean, the hope is that greater economic
integration and peace could be cultivated in the region. However, the escalation in conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan since 2023 has thrown the viability
of the Crossroads initiative into question. Even in 2023, Azerbaijan had not approved the Crossroads plan and instead suggested that Armenia cede some of its
territory to them to create the “Zangezur Corridor” between Azerbaijan’s two territories on either side of Armenia. Naturally, the proposal was and remains a
nonstarter for Armenia since it would involve giving up more land. Despite the Armenian government’s enthusiasm for the Crossroads, its future remains uncertain.

How much appetite exists in Armenia for this kind of peacebuilding initiative also remains unclear. According to anthropologist Aghasi Tadevosyan from the
National Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography, the political climate in Armenia is characterized by fear. In his work examining the
sentiments of contemporary Armenians, he found that they fear further aggression from Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Relatedly, they fear the loss of statehood and
sovereignty if Armenia’s territory is further depleted. Armenia’s inability to prevent Azerbaijan from capturing Artsakh has stoked the fear that one of their
neighbours could take their territory if so determined.

Walking through downtown Yerevan today, one is confronted by murals on underpass walls and the sides of buildings depicting the occasionally solemn and sometimes
smiling faces of young Armenians who died during the conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2016, 2020, and 2022. The murals appear across Armenia in places associated
with those they depict, such as where they lived or studied. This kind of commemoration was itself controversial, with some arguing that the public murals
continually reopen old wounds, while others favoured communal remembrance.

The death of approximately 3,825 Armenian servicemen in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War hit a country of only 3 million particularly hard. In addition to fearing
invasion, Armenians fear losing a generation of young men if hostilities resume. Thousands of military-age young men have also fled Armenia to countries such as
Germany or the United States to avoid military service, and between 2020–24, a reported 8,721 young men under 18 renounced their Armenian citizenship. Through war
or emigration, Armenians worry that the next generation will not be around to rebuild.

According to Tadevosyan, Armenia is going through a period of “remythication.” A new national narrative has arisen mythologizing the recent conflicts with
Azerbaijan and their meaning. The narrative elevates the heroism of Armenian soldiers and frames the recent losses to Azerbaijan not as a failure of the army,
but of the country’s political leadership. Connected to this perspective is a desire to launch a heroic reconquest of the lost territory, recalling the glory
of the 1918 victory against Türkiye at the Battle of Sardarabad, which enabled the creation of Armenia’s First Republic.

This perspective on the heroism of the military dovetails with the ways in which Armenia’s recent conflicts have been commemorated. As Tadevosyan notes, the
forms of remembrance used, such as the
h4.the political climate in Armenia is characterized by fear….contemporary Armenians…fear further aggression from Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Relatedly,
they fear the loss of statehood and sovereignty if Armenia’s territory is further depleted.

murals of fallen soldiers, are highly gendered and masculine, projecting a martial image of patriotism. Accordingly, the mythology surrounding the conflict
has had the effect of casting civic nationalists who prefer to focus on peace and the existing state as traitors to the nation’s history.

On the streets and in the cafes, Armenians mull over three strategic options related to their independence and survival: becoming the vassal of a powerful
state, retaining semi-independence under foreign patronage, or asserting full sovereignty. Those over fifty would prefer that Armenia become the vassal of a
stronger foreign actor, with Russia being considered the most likely option. The older generation recall the Soviet Union and are willing to sacrifice
independence for security.

Another possibility that Armenians discuss is semi-independence under the patronage of a friendly foreign state. Here the model is Belarus’s Union State
relationship with Russia. At the AUA conference in June, foreign scholars wondered how many Armenians view Russia as a potential benefactor given its
aggression in Ukraine. The reality is that desperation makes the possibility of Russian patronage more attractive than the prospect of Armenia losing
territory to its neighbours.

Whatever desire some Armenians have for renewed Russian patronage, it is unlikely in the near future. The Pashinyan government has actively sought to
distance itself from Russia and told the Armenian parliament in 2024 that the country would leave the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO). The lack of Russian support for Armenia during its recent conflicts with Azerbaijan eroded Armenian confidence in Russia. In September 2023, Russian
peacekeepers tasked with guarding Nagorno-Karabakh did nothing to stop Azerbaijan from capturing the region. The third option Armenia could pursue is greater
independence and sovereignty.

This is the preferred path of many Armenians, particularly the younger generation, but the challenge is security. Since 2020, there have been talks between
Armenia and Azerbaijan which could lead to a bilateral peace agreement and normalized relations, but this progress was stalled by the renewal of conflict.
Türkiye has said that it will wait for Azerbaijani approval before establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia. If progress were made here, Armenia would
no longer look to Russia for protection.

In March 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan announced that the text of a peace agreement had been finalized. However, Azerbaijan will not sign until Armenia amends
its constitution to remove some references to Nagorno- Karabakh. While the Pashinyan government favors this amendment, the government has become increasingly
unpopular. Opposition parties generally oppose the move and intend to make any referendum on the constitution a referendum on the Pashinyan government.
The text of the U.S.-brokered peace accord was released publicly in August 2025. Within Armenia, the terms were described as humiliating. Many of the provisions
focus only on resolving the dispute over Nagorno- Karabakh in favor of Azerbaijan, with Armenia effectively renouncing its claim to the region. Other disputes
between the countries, such as over the “Zangezur Corridor” or the delimitation of the borders, remain unresolved. The publication of the terms of the agreement
has further stoked criticism of the Pashinyan government, which is said to be conceding too much.

Armenia is going through a period of “remythication.” … Armenia’s national identity is in flux …The near future will be monumental for Armenia

The accord also calls for the withdrawal of security forces from the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) from the Armenian–Azerbaijani border, and for Armenia to
withdraw its lawsuits in both the European Court of Human Rights and International Court of Justice against Azerbaijan for human rights abuses. Analysts worry
that the departure of EUMA and the end of the lawsuits will remove some deterrents to Azerbaijani aggression, especially given the peace agreement’s lack of an
enforcement mechanism.

Negotiations with Azerbaijan are coming to a head with the possible referendum on amending the constitution, and these steps toward peace face major opposition
at home. Relatedly, it remains to be seen whether the Pashinyan government will survive the 2026 election. Armenia’s national identity is in flux, with those
hoping to construct a civic identity centred on the existing state staring down traditionalists who instead look to history for answers. The decisions made in
the next few years may define Armenia’s path for a generation.

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